Klima JohnBuridansNominalistLogic&c.pdf
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8.6
9
The appellation of concepts (appellatio rationis)....................................................... 160
The semantics of propositions.......................................................................................... 169
9.1
10
The semantics of propositional nominalizations (dicta)............................................. 173
Logical validity in a token-based, semantically closed logic ..................................... 175
10.1
Tarskian semantics vs. Buridan on the “Reciprocal Liar”.......................................... 180
10.2
Truth without complexe significabilia ........................................................................ 182
10.3
Logic without truth ..................................................................................................... 184
10.4
Correspondence without truth..................................................................................... 187
10.5
Truth without paradox................................................................................................. 188
10.6
An objection to Buridan’s solution ............................................................................. 192
10.7
The solution vindicated............................................................................................... 193
11
The possibility of scientific knowledge........................................................................ 194
11.1
The common epistemic principles of Buridan, Reid and Greco................................. 197
11.2
Putting skeptics in their place ..................................................................................... 198
11.3
Putting the skeptic in his place vs. stopping him in his tracks.................................... 206
11.4
Epistemology vs. metaphysics (or semantics)? .......................................................... 209
12
Buridan’s anti-skepticism ............................................................................................ 211
12.1
The Demon-argument ................................................................................................. 212
12.2
Exorcizing the Demon vs. learning to live with it ...................................................... 214
13
Buridan’s essentialist nominalism ............................................................................... 215
13.1
“Predicate-essentialism” without “realist essentialism” ............................................. 216
13.2
Buridan’s essentialism vs. skepticism......................................................................... 221
13.3
The conflict between Buridan’s semantics and abstractionism .................................. 222
13.4 Conclusion: empiricism, nominalism and essentialism in semantics, metaphysics and
epistemology ........................................................................................................................... 223
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 225
235