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NRC Meeting 512 .pdf



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26.11.2015

Nuclear ‘Uprating’ Process
= ‘Screwing’ ol’ shaky over-aged Nuke plants with Plutonium – power up 20%
...now with the only explanation through Edm0nd P a r i s -insight (see p.70).
.

"Move on folks, nothin to see 'ere..."
.
Scribd.com suddendly started to charge readers from my free documents. This without any notice to
me, all revenue to scribd. Isnt this funny kind of censorship...

GET THIS document FREE AT: slideshare.net/syottovasikka

Suomeksi - In Finnish - slideshare.net/syottovasikka/nrc-512-kokouspytkirja-02
I’d laugh all the way down – if this wasnt dead serious fukushima creating issue. ‘Enjoy…
especially ●● MR. SCARBROUGH’

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Advisory Committee 512th Meeting
[Note to reader this .pdf didnt transform here very nicely, thus lots of conn-ected words, numericcharacter errors. Take care, copy and spread. This transcript was briefly displayed in LATimes
before censorship hit it down; http://www. documents .latimes.com/background-on-nuclearuprating). The following has been derived from a intentionally dechiphered format of NCR nobody can follow its text without modding... Here some of that work is now done: ]

.
.
.
To the reader: this part works as an intro to understand the issues in the following Meetingdiscussions. Originally it was in the end of the memo.
The Continuing catastrophic failures, E.G. The G.E. “POTENTIAL ADVERSE FLOW
EFFECTS FROM POWER UPRATES”
David Terao Thomas G. Scarbrough Mechanical and Civil Engineering Branch Division of
Engineering NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation May 7, 2004
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.
.

INTRODUCTION
.
.
Since 1970s, Nuclear Reactor -licensees have been implementing power uprates [ = adding
Plutonium = MOX ] to increase Nuclear Power Plant electric output. [Plutonium utilization
increases dramatically Reactor core heat and also danger of uncontrolled meltdown. This means
that cooling water circulation speed and volume has to be increased exponentially... This heat

produces more steam and thus more power from steam turbines: steam age madness to boil water
with uranium]
Power uprates are categorized as:
- Measurement Uncertainty Recapture (about 1.5%)
- Stretch (about 6%).
- EPU – Extended Power Uprate (power increase up to about 20%).
[ NOTE: These uprates mean always adding more Plutonium in mox assemblies, cooling needs
increase 3x or more. [added]]
.
.
Catastrophic failures:
Cracking of RPV /Reactor internals is long-standing issue in BWR plants – even without
power uprates.
Some Nuclear Power Plants NPPs are experiencing additional problems with safety-related and
non-safety related equipment during Extended 20% Power Uprate (EPU) operation.
.
.
.

Steam Dryer Catastrophic Failures 2002 and 2003 [just in
USA]
.
SCOPE OF ADVERSE FLOW EFFECTS FROM POWER UPRATE OPERATION
- Quad Cities Units 1 & 2 experienced catastrophic failures of steam dryers during EPU operation.
- Quad Cities Unit 1 – June 2002: After 90 days of Extended 20% Power Uprate (EPU) operation,
steam dryer cover plate fails with pieces found on steam separators and in main steamline.
- Quad Cities Unit 2 – June 2003: After additional 300 days of Extended 20% Power Uprate EPU
operation, steam dryer experiences failure of hood, internal braces, and tie bars.
- Dresden Unit – October 2003: During RFO inspection after two years of Extended 20% Power
Uprate EPU operation, 4-inch cracks identified in steam dryer hood panels. Holes found in
feedwater sparger from broken sampling probe.
- Quad Cities Unit 1 – November 2003: After about one year of Extended 20% Power Uprate
EPU operation, steam dryer hood experiences significant cracking with 6x inch piece of outer bank
vertical plate missing. Damage also found to main steam electromatic relief valve (ERV), steamline
supports, and HPCI steam supply motor-operated valve. Steam Dryer Failure November 2003,
Missing portion of outer bank vertical plate, approx. 6×9 in.
- Dresden Unit 3 – Dec 2003: During shutdown inspection after about months of Extended 20%

Power Uprate EPU operation, two 4-inch through-wall cracks identified in steam dryer hood, and
two FW sampling probes found in sparger. Licensee determines FW sampling probe missing from
installed location.
- Quad Cities Unit 2 – March 2004: After about 8 months of Extended 20% Power Uprate EPU
operation, numerous steam dryer indications identified during refueling outage inspection including
cracking near gussets installed in 2003, broken tie bar welds, and damaged stiffener plate weld.
.

Other BWR steam dryer inspections in Spring 2004:
- Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (curved hood steam dryer) finds a thin 18-inch crack along a weld after
several years of operation at 4.3% power uprate.
- Brunswick Unit 1 (slanted hood steam dryer) finds only minor cracks after 2 years of operation at
Extended 13% Power Uprate (EPU).
- Vermont Yankee (square hood steam dryer) finds minor but numerous cracks after operation at
original licensed power.
- July 2002 Quad Cities Unit 2 steam dryer cover plate: high cycle fatigue due to high
frequency resonance (180 Hz) as a result of alignment of cover plate natural frequency, standing
acoustic wave frequency, and vortex shedding frequency. (This is actually operator and NRC
TEPCO-class fucu-incompetence as can be seen from the discussion)
- July 2003 Quad Cities Unit 2 steam dryer hood: high cycle fatigue due to low frequency
pressure loading (0 – 50 Hz).
- November 2003 Quad Cities Unit 1 steam dryer: high cycle fatigue from fluctuating pressure
loading with acoustics.
- 2003 Dresden FW probes: resonance frequency vibration.
- Quad Cities and Dresden more susceptible to adverse flow effects from Extended 20%
Power Uprate EPU operation: Steam dryer with square hood experiences greater stress than
slanted or curve hood design. Main steam lines with smaller diameter have higher steam
velocity. EPU power uprate involves more significant changes from original power level.
- January 2004: General Electric identifies fluctuating pressure load in acoustic range as
potential failure cause of Quad Cities steam dryers. Exelon study of vibration effects
determines Quad Cities ERVs unable to withstand Extended 20% Power Uprate EPU vibration for
full cycle.
- March 2004 Quad Cities Units 2 steam dryer: inadequate design [=NO DESIGN, TEPCO
class welder's ? own inventions] of previous gusset repair, movement of high stress point during
tie bar repair, and poor installation practice for stiffener plate.
.
.
.

PLANT-SPECIFIC CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- July 2002: Quad Cities Unit 2 steam dryer cover plate increased from 0.25 to 0.5 inch, outer
hood plates increased from 0.5 to 1
0.5 to 1 inch with gussets installed and braces removed.

- Oct 2003 Dresden 2 steam dryer modified similar to Quad Cities Unit 2
- Nov 2003: Quad Cities Unit 1 steam dryer modified similar to Quad Cities Unit 2
- Dec 2003: Dresden 3 steam dryer repair improved over Quad Cities Unit 1 and 2.
- March 2004: Quad Cities Unit 2 - Replacement of entire vertical plate of steam dryer hood.
Installation of full-length gussets on vertical plate. ERVs strengthened to support 2-year operation.
[ - hello!? - ONE YEAR UTLIZATION IS THE 'LAWFUL' STANDARD! After this the fuel
releases higly more radiation: Finland has used up to five years - and possibly the most polluted
radiating sea -status is their deliberated action... 125Bq/m3 compared to Pacific 3Bq/m3 ]
.
.
.

INDUSTRY ACTION
- Aug 2002: General Electric SIL (Service Information Letter) n0. 644 for square-hood steam
dryers to monitor moisture carryover and RFO inspections.
- Sept2003: Supplement 1 to SIL 644 to all BWRs with power uprates to monitor moisture
carryover and RFO inspections.
- Feb 2004: BWROG assumes industry lead for Extended 20% Power Uprate EPU vibration
issue. BWRVessel and Internals Project
- Mar2004: Exelon evaluated Dresden EPU operation with RFOs for Unit 2 in Nov 2005 and
Unit 3 in Nov 2004.

Definitions:
- BWROG – Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group – by General Electric. webpage info:
“Nuclear Services – Performance Services: The GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) Performance
Services portfolio offers existing nuclear plants a unique combination of experience, knowledge,
and capabilities. Asset Enhancement provides increased output and operational flexibility, Steam
Dryer Analysis provides evaluations to support power uprates [ = shaky plutonium Power boosts for
ol shaky reactors ], Controls & Systems Upgrades offers NUMAC, Reactivity Control, and other
Digital Controls, Technical Services provides technical support and optimized availability, and the
BWR Owners Group manages the BWROG activities.” [ = in-breeding self control ]
- Exelon Nuclear: Exelon distributes electricity to approximately 5.4 million customers in
northern Illinois and Pennsylvania and gas to approximately 480,000 customers in the Philadelphia
area. Exelon is headquartered in Chicago and trades on the NYSE under the ticker EXC. … Exelon
Selects GE Hitachi’s ESBWR (General Electric’s Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor
=ESBWR) – WILMINGTON, N.C.–(BUSINESS WIRE)–Illinois-based Exelon Nuclear, the
nation’s largest nuclear utility, has announced it will use GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy’s (GEH) nextgeneration ESBWR reactor design if the company decides to build a new nuclear power plant in
Texas. 12 November 2007
.

.

Exelon Commitments – April 2, 2004:
(EXELON = Nuke Users Group: nice tighknitted group inspecting itself)
- Limit Quad Cities I and 2 to Extended 20% Power Uprate – to pre-EPU power except for 72hour testing.
- Modify Quad Cities 1 electromatic relief valves before long-term Extended 20% Power Uprate
EPU operation.
- Provide specific commitments on obtaining NRC acceptance of Modify Quad Cities 1 and 2
Extended 20% Power Uprate EPU operation; [ hello! No sanctions on TEPCO-style fucu weldings
causin catastrophic failures! ]
- monitoring steam dryers and other components; [ LOL: monitor wassup - years has passed
with catastrophic failures - now start to "monitor" ]
- criteria for prompt corrective action if needed; [ eh? ]
- description of steam dryer loads; [ Description? They blatantly lied about simulation tests. Now
please give "description!" ]
- evaluation of Quad Cities 2 steam dryer repairs;
- independent review; [ independent? More EXELON brother reaping $-review flow ]
- re-evaluation of flow-induced vibration assessments; [ simulation? Noooooooo....]
- Extended 20% Power Uprate EPU vulnerability team effort; [ WELL YES. WE GOT TO
USE MORE PLUTONIUM! ]
- future steam dryer inspection plans. [ plans? ]
.
.
.

PLANNED INDUSTRY ACTION
- May 2004: BWROG to submit plan and GE/Exelon to complete operational improvement
recommendations.
- June 2004: General Electric to complete review of steam dryer and steam/feedwater
components. [ checkup who lied and screwed up the promised Simulation general Electric never did?
Nope... ]
- Sept 2004: BWR Vessel and Internals Project to complete steam dryer inspection guidance.
[ maybe just some day we can boost the old shaky - far over aged reactors - up to 50% more power with Plutonium distribution for the masses in mind? ]
.
.
.

NRC Staff [ non ] Action:

- Sept2002: Information Notice 2002-26 on QC 2 steam dryer cover plate failure.
- July2003: NRC Special Inspection Team and Supplement 1 to IN 2002-26 in response to Quad
Cities 2 steam dryer hood failure.
- Sept2003: NRC letter (9/26) to BWROG with comments on SIL 644 (Supplement 1).
- Nov 2003: Public meeting (11/5) with BWROG.
- Nov 2003: NRC discussions with Exelon on QC 1 steam dryer repair and lost parts. [ hello happy
merry-go-around with catastrophic failure parts ]
- Jan 2004 Supplement 2 to IN 2002-26 on Quad Cities I steam dryer and additional component
failures.
- Feb/Mar 2004 Public meetings (2/3 and 3/4) with BWROG.
- Mar 2004 IN 2004-06 on loss of FW sampling probes at Dresden 2 and 3. [ why probes
disappear. Not to worry, its fucunormal SAFE operation like sandbags , lets discuss sm more... ]
- Apr 2004 NRR/RES meetings to discuss research support on adverse flow effects from power
uprates. [ lets keep discussing over coffe latte how the catastrophic events could produce us more
Plutonium power - and fucudistribution on the stupido unawares ]
- Acknowledgement letter (4/20) to Exelon: No problem [ NO PROBLIMS !!? ] with
proceeding as described in April 2 letter.
Concerns with plans to justify Extended 20% Power Uprate long-term EPU operation at Quad
Cities and Dresden. Examples include:
Licensee did not indicate that loads (forcing function) causing steam dryer damage will be
identified. Quad Cities test plan not clear that sufficient data will be collected to assess dynamic
loading on steam dryer and other components. Dresden Extended 20% Power Uprate EPU basis did
not provide quantitative technical assessment of loadings and stresses that could fail steam dryer or
other components.
.
.

NRC Future Plans:
- Review of Exelon information supporting Quad Cities and Dresden Extended 20% Power
Uprated EPU operation.
- Regulatory communications being considered: Regulatory Issue Summary on potential adverse
flow effects from Extended 20% Power Uprates. [ should we have more coffe ltte about the
catastrophic failures or not? Should we kindly ask general Electric about their lies? Should we
consider that over aged Nukes should always be run only with lower - NOT HIGHER REVS? ]
- Generic regulatory action for other BWRs with Extended 20% Power Uprates.
- Review of Vermont Yankee Extended 20% Power Uprated request. [ review? No, just more
cafe latte ]
- Revision to power uprate review standard. [ eh, there is none - except the coffee... ]
.
.
.

Draft Research Plan

to AssessPotential [ The catastrophic failures ] = G.E. Adverse Flow Effects During BWR
[Plutonium ] Power Uprates,
Shah-Malik, Don Helton, ACRS Briefing: May 7,2004 .US. NRCi.
Due to recent events at Quad Cities 1 & 2 and Dresden 2 & 3 plants, a research program is being
planned in RES to address
adverse flow effects [ err catastrophic failures ] due to Extended 20% Power Uprates in BWRs
- Objectives of Research Program:
- Identify and determine relative significance of phenomena [ the catastrophic failures ] that
cause adverse flow effects in steam dryers and other components in steam and feedwater flow paths
leading to degradation and potential failures [ actual past catartrophes ] due to flow induced
vibration (FIV) and high cycle fatigue
- Apply these phenomena to characterize failures observed in BWR plants under Extended 20%
Power Uprate conditions
- Determine if there are any generic implications that can be drawn on the extent of the adverse
flow effects [ we never learn from anything, do we? ]
- Assess feasibility of developing a screening tool that NRR can use to review submittals on BWR
Extended 20% Power Uprates
- Support NRR in evaluating BWR Extended 20% Power Uprate submittals [ SUPPORT MORE
PLUTONIUM! ]
- acquire detailed plant data from general Electric [ eh, this time real drawings, no!? ]
- Affected components drawings and vibration monitoring data [ Oh boy whata demand: real
drawings!... hopefully the sensors wont now disappear... ]
- Scaled-model test data, in-plant test data
- Analytical modeling information (fluid and structural evaluations) [how about now askin about
the Eeneral Electric treason- that this flow simulation and analysis was already done - being the
base of all this MORE PLUTONIUM CATASTROPHIC FAILURES ... ? ]
- Licensee inspection information
- Procure tech. consultants in flow induced vibration (FIV) Computational fluid’ dynamics (CFD),
Fluid-structure interaction (FSI), FIV computational structural dynamics analyses (FEA)
- Perform CFD feasibility studies to predict vortex shedding [ this time dont believe General
Electric promises, no? ]
- Perform FEA structural dynamics studies (natural frequencies, mode shapes)
[how about now pursuing about the General Electric treason - their claim that this flow simulation
and analysis was already done - being the base of Extended 20% Power Uprates - behind all these
PLUTONIUM CATASTROPHIC FAILURES ... ? Nope obummers G.E., is the papal saint above
questioning. ]
.
Phase 2:
- Determine what FIV mechanisms are of concern; Turbulent loading, Vortex shedding, Acoustic
excitation, Any other mechanism
- Predict FIV loadings via thermal-hydraulic models
- Determine significance of fluid-structure interaction (FSI) [ was it done this time? ]
- Apply FIV loadings on finite element structural dynamic models and perform analyses
- Predict components’ failure modes
- Infer generic implications
- Develop potential screening tools for NRR’s use in review of submittals on power uprates

Timetable … Continue providing additional guidance to NRR in reviewing submittals as soon as
research information becomes available
.
.
.
.

- CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commissionin the matter of: Name of Proceeding: Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards the
Committee Meeting
Docket Number: n/aLocation: Rockville, MD were held as herein appears, and that this is the
original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by
me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting
company, and that thetranscript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings. Signed
by Rebecca Silberman.
FYI: [ ] -marked notes added later and relate to the banal discussion of catastrophic Nuke
Disaster as they were planning next volley ball beach- tournament . Especially note how
this ●● MR. SCARBROUGH is allowed to spin the whole panel and is not responsible to
anyone about anything – but can continue to play dice with 1000 million ppl lives!]
.
.
(There are lots of detailed pictures about these regularly occurring and continuing catastrophic
failures – possibly added later; here just one.)
.
.


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