PDF Archive

Easily share your PDF documents with your contacts, on the Web and Social Networks.

Share a file Manage my documents Convert Recover PDF Search Help Contact


Search


PDF Archive search engine
Last database update: 19 October at 09:05 - Around 220000 files indexed.

Search on pdf-archive.com All sites
Show results per page

Results for «disinformation»:


Total: 50 results - 0.035 seconds

50.Things.Youre.Not.Supposed.To.Know 100%

50.Things.Youre.Not.Supposed.To.Know Copyright © 2003 Russ Kick Published by The Disinformation Company Ltd.

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/01/05/50-things-youre-not-supposed-to-know/

05/01/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

UpskillingToUpscaleReport CapacityofCivilSocietytoCounterDisinformation June2018 RestrictedAccess June2018 (1) 96%

Unleashing the Capacity of Civil Society to Counter Disinformation EXPOSE NETWORK SCOPING – FINAL REPORT JUNE 2018 CONTENTS 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 UNDERSTANDING DISINFORMATION 2.1 DEFINITIONS 2.2 STRATEGY AND TACTICS 2.3 REGIONAL ANALYSIS 3 RESPONDING TO DISINFORMATION 3.1 TYPES OF RESPONSE 2.3.1 BALKANS 2.3.2 BALTICS 2.3.3 CENTRAL EUROPE 2.3.4 CAUCASUS 2.3.5 EASTERN EUROPE 2.3.6 SOUTHERN EUROPE

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2019/03/22/untitled-pdf-document-1/

22/03/2019 www.pdf-archive.com

JMoehring2018 94%

Devising and undertaking work to determine the relevance of the work on Russian disinformation and malign influence in Europe as part of an overall Russian strategy of confrontation to undermine the Euro-Atlantic defence and security community Sources:

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/13/jmoehring2018/

13/12/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

Skripal CaseStudy Discernment IFS2018 93%

Skripal CaseStudy Discernment IFS2018 THE SKRIPAL POISONING A CASE-STUDY IN COUNTERING DISINFORMATION INSTITUTE FOR STATECRAFT 2018 WHY THIS ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT IN SALISBURY, ENGLAND HAS SIGNIFICANT IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES AND THE RESISTANCE AGAINST RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION AND MANIPULATION Salisbury Cathedral, England DISCERNMENT IN ACTION Lessons learned from real-time media messages and responses The assassination attempt by poisoning of Sergei and Julia Skripal in Salisbury has exposed brutal Russian aggression towards the UK and the extent of their willingness to follow through this action with an extensive media disinformation campaign.

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/13/skripalcasestudydiscernmentifs2018/

13/12/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

My contribution 91%

I think the Integrity Initiative could create a dashboard on the web that shows the latest disinformation and propaganda surrounding the biggest stories of the moment, for example.

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/28/my-contribution/

28/12/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

The Integrity Initiative Guide to Countering Russian Disinformation May 2018 v1 91%

The Integrity Initiative Guide to Countering Russian Disinformation May 2018 v1 The Integrity Initiative Guide to Countering Russian Disinformation 1.

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/untitled-pdf-document-1/

02/11/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

FCO US Integrity Initiative 89%

Its aim is to track, expose and counter the increasing current of Russian malign influence and disinformation throughout the West.

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/28/fcousintegrityinitiative/

28/12/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

ZINC Network Technical Response Final 87%

2 1.1 Executive Summary State backed disinformation is not just about propagating false or misleading information, but more broadly about manipulating the information environment to further anti-democratic objectives such as undermining the credibility of mainstream media, growing cynicism and distrust towards democratic institutions and processes, increasing polarisation between communities, or destabilising international alliances.

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2019/03/22/zinc-networktechnical-responsefinal/

22/03/2019 www.pdf-archive.com

30408 87%

However, Russian claims that the Scottish independence referendum was fixed certainly fuelled the broader campaign to question the vote,1 and the Kremlin-funded media certainly amplified and expanded on those claims.2 Anecdotal evidence supports the thesis that this coverage had at least some degree of impact on some individual voters;3 the degree to which the disinformation has penetrated different audiences merits further study.

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2016/04/02/30408/

02/04/2016 www.pdf-archive.com

II handbook v2 86%

The Integrity Initiative aims to unite people who understand the threat, in order to provide a coordinated Western response to Russian disinformation and other elements of hybrid warfare.

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/iihandbookv2/

02/11/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

FCO Integrity Initiative US doc 85%

Its aim is to track, expose and counter the increasing current of Russian malign influence and disinformation throughout the West.

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/28/fco-integrity-initiative-us-doc/

28/12/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

INTERIM REPORT 85%

Migration is primarily a domestic political issue and relevant in the EU context but the issue is exploited by Russian propaganda and disinformation.3 Hannes Adomeit, „Nach dem Helsinki Gipfel:

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/28/-interim-report/

28/11/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

II media interviews 2018 81%

II media interviews 2018 Representative selection of Integrity Initiative staff 2018 presentations and media interviews on Russian disinformation and malign influence 1.

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/13/ii-media-interviews-2018/

13/12/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

Ether CompanyInsurgency Official Documentation 77%

Any knowledge concerning Ether Company’s existence and/or activity must be apprehended, and disinformation tactics/ Level-2 amnestics must be administered.

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2017/07/22/ether-companyinsurgency-official-documentation/

22/07/2017 www.pdf-archive.com

CND SPCD notes 77%

The Greek Government well understands the value of disinformation and uses it domestically.

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/28/cnd-spcd-notes/

28/11/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

meetings in greece feb 2017 77%

The Greek Government well understands the value of disinformation and uses it domestically.

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/28/meetings-in-greece-feb-2017/

28/11/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

Ramping up IfS work 16 03 2018 75%

  expose the attack while highlighting and countering Russian disinformation about it, to generate as much foreign support as possible for the UK, at every level and as soon as possible.

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/13/ramping-up-ifs-work-16-03-2018/

13/12/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

The Institute for Statecraft Expert Team v 3 74%

deep expertise in Russian thinking, Russian influence and disinformation operations, including in the Catalan separatist issue.

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/13/the-institute-for-statecraft-expert-team-v-3/

13/12/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

Balkans Trip Report SBL 73%

In regard to our discernment program, described the work of Globe Sec, and their work to teach the power of disinformation to the younger generation/ Information Warfare and the New World Order, Case Study:

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/28/balkans-trip-report-sbl/

28/11/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

Discernment paper BR2018 08.06 proposal2 73%

Fake imagery, misleading headlines and captions, and distorted reporting can enable disinformation to take root and spread virally.

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/28/discernment-paperbr20180806proposal2/

28/12/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

Cluster Roundup Jul18 69%

Although the principle target is Russian disinformation and influence, where appropriate clusters also consider other sources of interference where these interact with the Russian.

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/clusterroundupjul18/

02/11/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

FranciszekCudek 66%

Taking that into account, what is distinctive about Nussbaum’s commentary is the fact that, on the contrary to most other contemporary commentators of socio-political discourse, she lays responsibility for the public disinformation not on the intentions of the demagogues, but on the incompetence of concrete individuals to consciously participate in the political space and disability to demark profound statements from the shallow ones (or maybe more accurately concerning the later semantic analysis – the elucidating ones from the misleading ones).

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2017/06/04/franciszekcudek/

04/06/2017 www.pdf-archive.com

FCO application form 2017-18 65%

To be completed by the Project Implementer Project Title INTEGRITY INITIATIVE Purpose To counter Russian disinformation and malign influence in Europe by:

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/fco-application-form-2017-18/

02/11/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

FCO application form 2018 v2 65%

To be completed by the Project Implementer Project Title INTEGRITY INITIATIVE Phase II Purpose To counter Russian disinformation and malign influence, and associated weapons of “Hybrid warfare”, in Europe and North America by:

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/11/02/fco-application-form-2018-v2/

02/11/2018 www.pdf-archive.com

GRowett2018 65%

Great interest expressed from several other national chapters in future cooperation in exposing and combatting Russian disinformation operations.

https://www.pdf-archive.com/2018/12/28/growett2018/

28/12/2018 www.pdf-archive.com