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factsheet puertoricoseconomicandfiscalcrisis .pdf



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Puerto Rico’s Economic and Fiscal Crisis
The Economic Situation is Challenging
Puerto Rico has experienced a sharper recession than the rest of the United States, and the
economy continues to contract. Since Puerto Rico’s economy began to contract in 2006, the
economy has shrunk by more than 10 percent and employment on the island has fallen by 14
percent.1 Puerto Rico’s unemployment rate was 11.6 percent in August 2015, more than twice
the national level. The scale and depth of Puerto Rico’s downturn stems from many factors,
including a boom and bust cycle in real estate and credit prior to the current fiscal crisis,
longstanding problems of fiscal governance, deteriorating confidence among all stakeholders,
and a structure of taxation and benefits that fails to provide the same reward for work as in the
fifty states.
Poverty levels are the highest in the nation. The number of residents living at or
below the federal poverty level exceeds 45 percent, compared to a national
average of about 16 percent. The median annual household income in Puerto
Rico is approximately $19,000, roughly one-third of the level of median income
in the United States.
The worsening financial crisis has already caused residents to flee the island at an
alarming pace. More than 300,000 people have left Puerto Rico in the past 10
years, including 84,000 people in 2014 alone.
The remaining population is one that is increasingly older and not actively
seeking work. Labor force participation in Puerto Rico, at 39.7 percent, is
substantially below the U.S. average of 62.4 percent. Persons 60 years and older
represent more than 23 percent of the population – one of the highest in the
United States.
Without additional reforms in Puerto Rico and decisive action by Congress, Puerto Rico’s
economy will continue to contract. Puerto Rico’s Planning Board projects that economic output
will decline by roughly one percentage point this year due in part to a pronounced contraction in
business investment. This trend is likely to continue without real reform and changes in federal
policy, as local residents continue to migrate to the fifty states.

1

As a point of reference, during the Great Recession, the U.S. economy shrank by 4 percent and total employment
fell by 6 percent.

1

Local Population
Millions
3.90
3.85
3.80
3.75
3.70
3.65
3.60
3.55
3.50
1990

2014

3.5 mn

1995

2000

2005

2010

Source: World Bank.

Government Development Bank Economic Activity Index
Index, Jan. 1980 = 100
160
Aug-15
155
150
145
140
135
127.1
130
125
120
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Source: Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico.

The Current Fiscal Situation is Unsustainable
Puerto Rico’s economic challenges predate its current fiscal crisis. The sustained slump in
the economy has contributed to the island’s fiscal challenges, and Puerto Rico’s fiscal challenges
have in turn added to the difficulty it faces attracting private investment and restarting growth.
Puerto Rico has a history of poor fiscal performance. Historically, Puerto Rico’s budgets
relied on unrealistic revenue estimates, and, as a result, annual budgets masked recurring
structural deficits. Moreover, past revenue and expense measures have fallen short because
Puerto Rico lacks important fiscal controls to ensure discipline. Poor financial disclosure has
impaired the ability to track progress against reforms enacted – reporting is opaque and deadlines
have repeatedly been missed.
Puerto Rico effectively has been shut out of the traditional municipal bond market since
2013. Puerto Rico, like any other U.S. state or territory, has historically relied on the municipal
markets for relatively low-cost financing. However, over the last two years it has relied on a
2

high-cost bond placed with nontraditional lenders and the sale of assets – including pension
assets – to meet ongoing commitments and cover fiscal gaps. In the past year, the
Commonwealth has completely lost access to market funding; it no longer can raise even shortterm financing.
Most of Puerto Rico’s uninsured bonds trade at between 30 and 70 cents on the
dollar, prices that imply a high probability of a restructuring.
Even the most highly-valued Puerto Rico bonds yield 11 percent, making longterm market financing prohibitively expensive. Prior to its crisis, Puerto Rico
issued at yields in line with the rest of the market: for example, its 2006 General
Obligation (G.O.) bonds were priced to yield 4.8 percent.
Puerto Rico’s bonded indebtedness is approximately $71 billion (over 100% of
GNP), including close to $50 billion (70% of GNP) in tax-supported debt.2
As of FY2014, Puerto Rico’s three public pension funds held just $2 billion in net
assets against a combined estimated pension liability of $46 billion.
Puerto Rico’s government is out of cash and is increasingly out of options.
Government services and debt payments have only continued because Puerto Rico
is deploying onerous and unsustainable emergency liquidity actions. These
measures include delaying payment of tax refunds to residents, liquidating
pension assets early to fund working capital, borrowing from Puerto Rico’s
proprietary insurance funds, failing to pay certain appropriation debts,
withholding monthly set-aside funds for debt service, and stretching payment of
accounts payables to vendors and other third parties.
Even with these emergency actions, Puerto Rico forecasts it will completely run
out of liquidity before year end. Once that happens, Puerto Rico will face the
unenviable and difficult choice between repaying its debts and maintaining vital
public services.

2

Gross National Product (GNP) as opposed to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is typically a more representative
measure of Puerto Rico’s economy, as it includes the income accruing to island residents but excludes the
significant portion of income generated on the island that accrues to non-island residents, particularly in the
manufacturing sector.

3

Commonwealth Monthly Cash Balance

Before Emergency Measures
After Emergency Measures

Millions of $
1,500

888

1,000
500

221

103

252

218

146

741

308

28

0
(30)

(500)
(1,000)

(205)
(638)

(717)
(987)

(600)

(512)
(875)

(1,080)

(1,500)

(1,236)

(1,425)

(1,259)

(1,246)

(1,201)

(1,478)

(2,000)

Jul-15

Aug-15

Sep-15

Oct-15

Nov-15

Dec-15

Jan-16

Feb-16

Mar-16

Apr-16

May-16

Jun-16

Source: Puerto Rico Fiscal and Economic Growth Plan, pgs. 13-14.

Significant Challenges Remain Despite Reform Efforts
Puerto Rico’s recently released Fiscal and Economic Growth Plan outlines the scale of the
fiscal challenges it faces. The Fiscal and Economic Growth Plan draws on the independent
forensic accounting report of Conway MacKenzie and presents a consolidated picture of the
public sector finances prepared with the support of former staff from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) led by Anne Krueger. It presents an accurate measure of Puerto Rico’s contracted
debt payments, without “scoop and toss” off-budget refinancing of various debts. The numbers
continue to be refined, but there is no doubt that there is a large gap between Puerto Rico’s
required operating expenses, contractual debt obligations and its available financial resources.
Debt service now consumes more than one-third of annual revenues when looking
comprehensively at the full range of debt supported primarily by the Commonwealth’s taxing
authority. This compares to a U.S. median of approximately five percent for states in fiscal year
2014, according to Moody’s Investors Service. Building on the work of Anne Krueger and her
IMF team, the Fiscal and Economic Growth Plan provides, for the first time, a transparent
accounting of Puerto Rico’s tax-supported debt service beyond what is presented in its general
fund budgets.
Important fiscal adjustments have been implemented in recent years:
Operating expenses are shrinking after taking into consideration debt payments.
In fact, general fund expenses for the current fiscal year, net of debt service, are
currently at their lowest level since 2005, both in nominal terms and as a share of
GNP.
A strict fiscal sustainability act (Law 66) has been enacted to reduce government
expenses. Among other measures, the law froze collective bargaining agreements
already in place that involve salary increases and other benefits.

4

The tax on petroleum and petroleum products was quintupled from $3.00 to
$15.50/barrel – projected to generate approximately $360 million a year in
additional revenues.
The local sales and use tax was increased from 7.0 percent to 11.5 percent (now
the highest in the nation) – a measure that is expected to generate well over a $1.0
billion a year in additional revenues.
Nevertheless, additional fiscal adjustment remains necessary, building on the measures
proposed in the Fiscal and Economic Growth Plan. In addition to implementing the sales tax
hike and transitioning to a value-added tax, the Fiscal and Economic Growth Plan also proposed
changes to Puerto Rico’s safety net, reforms to improve tax collections, permitting
simplification, the consolidation of public schools and reduced subsidies for municipalities and
higher education.
However, there are practical limits on the scale and pace of fiscal adjustment in an
economy that is significantly smaller than in 2005. Too much adjustment could push Puerto
Rico into a downward spiral, with the successive rounds of fiscal consolidation pulling the
economy down, encouraging more outmigration, reducing revenues and requiring additional
taxes or cuts. Only a return to growth can end this vicious cycle.
Stronger fiscal governance is critical. While the Fiscal and Economic Growth Plan is a
welcome first step towards increased transparency, there is more work to do. The Plan proposes
a new accounting system, a new budgetary process, reforms to the structure of Puerto Rico’s
Treasury Department, and steps to improve budget execution across Puerto Rico’s many
agencies. These steps need to be reinforced by independent and credible fiscal oversight to
provide sufficient safeguards to ensure Puerto Rico adheres to its reforms. Doing so would
likely restore confidence among stakeholders.
General Fund Approved Budget

Debt Service

Millions of $, Fiscal Year

General Fund (excl. debt service)

14,000
13,000
12,000

11,000
10,000
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000

10,170

8,850
8,295
556

594

9,045

9,310

9,219

382

610

554

9,484

663

393

8,663

8,700

8,665

9,507

8,256

9,091

7,739

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Note: Debt service for FY16 includes $275M from Special Economic Development & Debt Service Fund.
Source: Puerto Rico Office of Management & Budget FY2016 Proposed Budget Presentation.

5

9,770

9,150

9,260

9,083

718

671

527

8,432

8,589

8,556

2011

2012

2013

655

9,115

2014

9,565

9,800

1,138

1,475

8,427

8,325

2015

2016

Debt Restructuring is Unavoidable
Puerto Rico’s Fiscal and Economic Growth Plan outlines a $28 billion fiscal gap over the
next five years in the absence of any policy changes. This exceeds the $18 billion in contracted
debt service, underscoring the need for improved fiscal controls and additional fiscal adjustment.
The full implementation of the measures outlined in the Fiscal and Economic Growth Plan,
including, critically, the increase in the sales tax and transition to a value-added tax, is estimated
to close the financing gap by half. This estimate includes sizeable projected revenue gains from
an assumed return to stronger growth in 2019 and 2020. Even with these projected gains, there
is a five-year gap of $14 billion – a gap that likely will need to be filled, in part, through a
renegotiation of the Commonwealth’s large and complex debt burden.
Puerto Rico’s Pension Systems are Also at Serious Risk
Puerto Rico’s public pension system is also in crisis, and can no longer be used to help
finance government operations. There is a long-standing discrepancy between what the
Commonwealth contributes to the system and the annual required contribution stipulated by the
systems’ actuaries. As part of a 2013 reform, required employer contributions will gradually be
raised from 10 to over 20 percent of payroll, bringing total employee and employer contributions
to 30 percent of payroll, and changes were made to the accrual of future benefits in the largest
public pension fund. Nevertheless, Puerto Rico’s public pension funds have the lowest funded
ratio of any state or territory.
While legislation designed to comprehensively the Island’s largest public pension
system, the Employee Retirement System (ERS), was enacted in 2013, the portion
of the legislation related to its second largest system, the Puerto Rico’s Teachers
Retirement System (TRS), was partially overturned by Puerto Rico’s Supreme
Court.
Furthermore, the Commonwealth has not made the additional contributions to the
public pension system required and contractually mandated under the 2013
reform. In FY2014, the Commonwealth was only able to pay current pension
benefits through the sale of close to one billion in assets from its three public
pension funds.
The unsustainable drawdown on pension fund assets has continued. At current
drawdown rates, the assets of the two main public pension funds will be depleted
before the end of the decade. At the end of FY2014, Puerto Rico’s three public
pension funds held just $2 billion in net assets against a combined estimated
pension liability of $46 billion.

6

The Commonwealth recently accelerated public pension fund asset sales to help
provide short-term financing for core governmental operations as part of its
emergency actions.
The Commonwealth’s forward-looking fiscal plan cannot rely on the sale of
pension assets to help the Commonwealth meet its other contractual obligations;
future budgets will need to raise contributions to the pension systems to protect
the Commonwealth’s ability to pay retiree’s benefits.
Any restructuring of Puerto Rico’s financial liabilities should account for the promises the
Commonwealth has made to its public servants.

Pension Assets (left axis) & Funded Ratios (right axis)
Percent

Millions of $
3,500

3,000

70

ERS Assets

TRS Assets

ERS Funded Ratio

TRS Funded Ratio

60

2,500

50

2,000

40

1,500

30

1,000

20

500

10

0

0
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Note: Reflects net assets. 2014 ERS estimates are preliminary. 2008 TRS assets are interpolated.
Source: ERS, TRS Actuarial Reports; Commonwealth Quarterly Report, May 2015.

ERS & TRS Ending Gross Balances (excluding AUCs)
Millions of $
2,000
1,500

Liquid Assets
Illiquid, Restricted & Other Assets

850
327

1,000
500
0

545
885

418

885 191
418

737
238

315
(142)

(500)

(53)
(511)

(1,000)
ERS TRS

ERS TRS

ERS TRS

ERS TRS

ERS TRS

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Note: AUC denotes additional uniform contribution.
Source: Puerto Rico Fiscal & Economic Growth Plan, pg. 77.

7


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